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Guest Editorial

The rise of foreign intelligence activity on American soil is no longer limited to Cold War-style spycraft in Washington, DC. Today, adversarial intelligence services target universities, local infrastructure, and private industry in cities and towns across the country. Despite this, the federal government—especially the FBI—remains the primary mechanism for counterintelligence (CI) investigations and threat response. The public, meanwhile, is often told to “see something, say something,” yet has no clear or trusted pathway to report suspicions of espionage, intellectual property theft, or foreign interference. If counterintelligence is to become a whole-of-society effort, as national security leaders increasingly suggest, then state and local law enforcement must be empowered to serve as first-line receivers of CI-related reporting from the public.

The FBI has long led the CI mission, and for good reason—it has statutory authority and specialized training to detect, investigate, and disrupt foreign intelligence operations. However, the scope and scale of the threat environment has changed dramatically. According to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), the People’s Republic of China has “expanded its targeting beyond traditional government and defense sectors” and now seeks to “acquire critical technologies and data from the private sector, academia, and research institutions [1]”. The targeting is often subtle, indirect, and geographically dispersed. One 2021 FBI report noted over 2,000 active investigations into Chinese espionage, spread across all 56 FBI field offices [2]. These numbers make clear what practitioners already know: foreign intelligence threats are not centralized—they are diffused throughout American society.

Despite the expansion of threat vectors, most CI messaging still reflects a top-down, federally oriented model. Citizens who suspect foreign intelligence activity are theoretically expected to contact the FBI or a relevant federal agency. In practice, however, most Americans lack familiarity with these institutions or view them as inaccessible. It is unlikely that a lab technician at a state university or a public utilities worker would cold-call an FBI field office over ambiguous concerns about suspicious inquiries or strange behavior. What they are far more likely to do is contact local law enforcement—whether to ask a question, report a concern, or simply flag a pattern. Yet most police departments lack CI training, and many officers are unfamiliar with what espionage tradecraft might even look like in a civilian context.

This creates a dangerous gap: the public is encouraged to be vigilant but has no realistic or trusted channel for reporting low-level CI concerns. The solution is not to ask local police to become counterintelligence officers, but to train them in basic CI awareness and to establish formalized referral relationships with federal counterparts. State fusion centers—originally designed to support counterterrorism—already offer a model for integrating intelligence awareness into local law enforcement. Expanding this model to include counterintelligence indicators would provide a broader base of public-facing personnel who understand how to receive and pass on suspicious activity that may have foreign intelligence implications.

A simple example illustrates the point. In recent years, several research universities have discovered faculty members or visiting scholars working secretly on behalf of foreign governments [1]. In many cases, their suspicious behavior—misrepresented affiliations, unusual data access, travel patterns—was first noticed by colleagues, administrators, or campus police. However, due to a lack of clarity about reporting channels and inadequate training in recognizing foreign intelligence activity, these concerns were likely either ignored or routed through internal academic systems rather than law enforcement. Only after prolonged damage—whether IP theft or strategic leakage—were federal authorities brought in. Had local law enforcement or university police been trained to recognize and escalate potential CI concerns, federal investigators might have acted sooner.

Critics may argue that expanding CI responsibilities to local police risks politicization or civil liberties violations. These are valid concerns, and any local-federal partnership must be built on clear legal parameters and strong oversight. However, it is not unprecedented. Police departments already receive training to recognize terrorism indicators, human trafficking, and cybercrime—all areas of complex jurisdiction and legal sensitivity. Incorporating CI awareness simply acknowledges the evolving threat landscape and the vital role of local actors in national security [3].

Ultimately, if “see something, say something” is to be more than a slogan, the public must have a clear and trusted place to say something to. In many communities, local police are that place. They are visible, accessible, and culturally embedded in ways federal agencies are not. By equipping state and local law enforcement with the tools and knowledge to recognize and refer CI concerns, we strengthen the national security posture of the country—not by replacing the FBI, but by extending its reach. Counter-intelligence in the 21st century demands not just a federal response, but a networked society that knows what to look for, and where to turn.

References

1. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, National Counterintelligence Strategy, 2024, 30 July 2024.
2. Christopher Wray, testimony, FBI Active Investigations into Chinese Espionage, FBI, 2021, accessed April 11, 2025.
3. S. House of Representatives, Scholars or Spies: Foreign Plots Targeting America's Research and Development, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 115^th Congress, 2^nd Session, April 11, 2018, accessed April 11, 2025.