

Policy Entrepreneurs and Mobilization Strategies: Case Studies of Ghana's Energy and Natural Resource Policy Reforms

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Abstract

Although several prominent policy theories and frameworks have made significant contributions regarding the behavior of policy entrepreneurs in the policy process, they have not adequately conceptualized and explained the entrepreneurial strategies of political mobilization. To address this gap, we revisited the Mobilization model by Cobb, Ross, and Ross [1]. Drawing on both the scientific and grey literature, we conducted two case studies of agenda-setting in Ghana, where the strategic actions taken by Presidents Kufuor and Mills to successfully change fuel subsidy policy in 2005 and petroleum revenue management policy from 2009 to 2011, respectively, followed the Mobilization model and the Initiation, Specification, Expansion, and Entrance stages of agenda-setting. This study contributes to the empirical literature on policy entrepreneurship and political mobilization strategies and promotes the application and refinement of the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models.

Keywords: Agenda-setting; Fuel subsidy; Petroleum revenue management; Policy entrepreneurs; Mobilization strategies

Abbreviations: MSF: Multiple Streams Framework; ACF: Advocacy Coalitions Framework; EC: Epistemic Community; IC: Instrument Constituency; GDP: Gross domestic product; NPA: National Petroleum Authority; IMF: International Monetary Fund; PSIA: Poverty and Social Impact Assessment; PRMA: Petroleum Revenue Management Act; GHF: Ghana Heritage Fund; GSF: Ghana Stabilization Fund

Introduction

Agenda-setting is the process of transforming the concerns of various actors into potential candidates for government action by identifying and articulating problems and generating possible solutions Cobb, Ross, and Ross [1], Liu [2]. It is "perhaps the most critical stage" of the policy process as it has consequences for the remaining stages, namely policy formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation, as well as the outcomes of the policy that would be made Howlett [3]. Agenda is defined as the list of issues/problems that actors such as government officials, interest groups, and the public are seriously concerned about. The public agenda consists of issues that have high public interest and concerns a significant proportion of the public, while the formal/government agenda consists of issues that have been officially accepted by decision-makers for serious consideration and possible action Cobb and Elder [4], Cobb, Ross, and Ross [1]. Given that at any point in time there are myriads of problems

and concerns contending for government action, not all issues on the public agenda have the momentum to progress onto the formal agenda. Additionally, government officials cannot address all the issues on the formal agenda because they have limited resources. Hence, the agenda-setting process filters and narrows the formal agenda to a list of critical problems for consideration, while delisting others Kingdon [5]. It should be noted, however, that this stage is not a guarantee that a particular problem on the formal agenda will be solved by the government, but rather an advancement of the problem from a state of concern to a state public recognition and deserving government action Howlett [3].

Several prominent theories and frameworks have been developed to conceptualize the strategic behavior of influential actors and policy entrepreneurs in the policy process. For instance, Kingdon's [5] Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) introduced the concept of the policy entrepreneur who links

problems, solutions, and political opportunities during a “policy window” to effect policy change. Sabatier’s [6] Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF) theory conceptualizes influential actors from government, political parties, and interest groups who are drawn together to form coalitions to promote or discourage policy change. Haas’ (1992) Epistemic Community (EC) framework describes professional networks of Knowledge-based actors, including academics, international organizations and government officials with “expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain”. Voß and Simons [7] introduced the Instrument Constituency (IC) framework to describe very diverse groups of actors, including academics, consultants, public agencies, and interest groups, drawn together to promote policy instruments that serve their individual interests. The ACF, EC, and IC frameworks collectively expand our understanding of the strategic behaviors of key actors in the policy process Ofori [8], including policy entrepreneurs. Additionally, scholars have described the specific strategies and behaviors that policy entrepreneurs adopt to be successful in setting agendas or securing policy change. Zahariadis [9] contended that policy entrepreneurs with requisite resources such as time and access

to decision-makers, act as “power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences” and apply manipulating strategies such as framing and the use of salami tactics and symbols. Cairney [10] added that successful policy entrepreneurs frame problems, equip themselves with possible solutions to the problems, and exploit decision makers. According to Faling et al. (2019), there are five categories of strategies discussed in the literature, namely “issue promotion, issue framing, coalition-building, manipulating institutions and leading by example”. In their meta-analysis of 229 articles covering four decades of policy scholarship, Aviram [11] identified 20 different strategies of policy entrepreneurs. These include strategic information dissemination, forging partnerships, networking with actors outside government, venue shopping, and risk-taking. Despite these significant advances in policy process theorization, the empirical literature on agenda-setting has not given adequate attention to the mobilization strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ in the different stages of agenda-setting. Interestingly, Cobb, Ross, and Ross [1] introduced three models and four stages of agenda-setting that describe the mobilization strategies of successful policy entrepreneurs (Table 1), long before the emergence of prominent frameworks such as the MSF and ACF.

Table 1: Three models and four stages of agenda-setting by Cobb, Ross, and Ross (1976).

Stages of agenda-setting	Description of strategies	Models		
		Outside Initiative (OI)	Mobilization (M)	Inside Initiative (II)
<i>Initiation</i>	Articulate concerns and impacts of issue/problem to create awareness	Publicize concerns about problem	Announce plans to address problem	Announce plans to address problem but keep it away from public
<i>Specification</i>	Translate concerns of problem into specific demands or actions needed regarding how the problem could be addressed, noting that a problem can generate various demands.			
<i>Expansion</i>	Expand concerns of problem to list problem on public (OI & M) or formal (II) agenda	Recruit influential actors in the discourse to garner support for government action. Narrate concerns and demands of problem to influential actors		
<i>Entrance</i>	Successfully list problem on formal (OI, II) or public (M) agenda	Move problem from public to formal agenda to garner support from key actors for government action	Move problem from the formal to the public agenda to enlist public support for successful implementation of proposed policy	Move the problem to the formal agenda. Decision to address problem stays within government but achieves formal agenda status with adequate support from key actors

Cobb et al. [1] developed the Outside Initiative, Mobilization and Inside Initiative models of agenda-setting, and introduced the four stages of agenda-setting, namely Initiation, Specification, Expansion, and Entrance. Rather than focus on why and how problems and issues emerge, they advanced propositions to characterize how policy entrepreneurs strategically list problems or issues on the agenda. Cobb et al. [1] explained that the Outside Initiative model is useful for entrepreneurs outside government, while the Mobilization and Inside Initiative models are for entrepreneurs inside government. For entrepreneurs

outside government, the Outside Initiative model describes how they strategically list the issue on the public agenda first to gain public support, before listing it on the formal agenda. Under the Mobilization model, an issue that is raised by a key governmental actor is typically listed on the formal agenda already. However, the Mobilization model holds that it is beneficial to list an issue on the public agenda to mobilize public support for the successful implementation of the proposed policy Cobb et al. [1]. There are some instances where listing an issue on the public agenda is either not necessary or the issue needs to be kept away from

public discourse, but adequate support from key governmental actors is needed. In such instances, the Inside Initiative model describes the process by which policy entrepreneurs keep an issue away from the public yet secures the support of other key governmental actors for successful agenda-setting Cobb et al. [1].

Cobb et al. [1] explained the Initiation stage is the first stage in the process of agenda-setting where the concerns, problems, or grievances of the issue are articulated by the entrepreneur. For instance, entrepreneurs outside the government may publicize their concerns about a problem (Outside Initiative model). For those within government, they may announce their intention to address a problem (Mobilization model). This public announcement places the issue on the formal agenda especially if it was made by a key decision-making official Cobb et al. [1]. But under the Inside Initiative model, the announcement stays within the government. At the Specification stage, the entrepreneur needs to translate the concerns of the issue into specific demands, noting that an issue can generate various demands Cobb et al. [1]. At the Expansion stage, the entrepreneur needs to expand and list the issue on the public agenda by including other actors in the discourse to garner support for government action (Outside Initiative and Mobilization models). At this stage, entrepreneurs outside government would need to expand the issue by including influential actors. They would need to expand the issue by

narrating the problem, concerns and demands to those who may even not be affected by the problem, although immediate support may come from those who have direct connections to the problem Cobb et al. [1]. By Expanding the issue, the entrepreneur creates awareness to secure public support, an important milestone that commands the attention of decision-makers.

For instance, an elected official may want to Expand an issue to further explain what the government intends to achieve with a policy after the official announcement, especially in situations where public support is central to policy implementation Cobb et al. [1]. But, under the Inside Initiative model, the entrepreneur would need to Expand the issue to win the support and cooperation of other officials and agencies within government to ensure successful implementation of proposed policies. Entrance is the final stage where the issue moves from the public agenda to the formal agenda (Outside Initiative model), from the formal agenda to the public agenda (Mobilization model), or stays within the government but achieves the status of formal agenda with enough support of key actors (Inside Initiative model). Hence, for a policy entrepreneur to successfully build agenda by listing an issue on the formal or public agenda, the entrepreneur requires knowledge of who identified the problem and how different key actors operate in the policy subsystem that the issue belongs to Cobb et al. [1].




Figure 1: Publications that have applied or mentioned the Outside Initiative, Mobilization and Inside Initiative (OI, M & II) models, Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF), Epistemic Community (EC) framework, and Instrument Constituency (IC) framework from 1985 to 2020.

Unlike the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models, the MSF, ACF, EC, and IC frameworks have been receiving increasing attention over the years since their introduction. We conducted a search of peer-reviewed, English publications

in the Scopus database using the search string below. Figure 1 displays the results of the search with a graph of publications that have either applied or cited the models and frameworks in all policy fields from 1985 to 2020. A total of 661, 610, 491 and

22 publications have utilized or mentioned the MSF, ACF, EC, and IC frameworks, respectively. However, only 25 publications have applied or mentioned the Outside Initiative, Mobilization or Inside Initiative model. Since their emergence, the MSF, ACF, EC, and IC frameworks have, respectively, averaged about 18, 17, 17 and 3 publications annually, while the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models have collectively lagged behind, averaging only about 1 publication per year.

Several studies have reviewed the application of the MSF, ACF, EC, and IC frameworks in the policy process literature Ofori [8]. As evident in Figure 1, the application of the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models in the policy process literature is very limited. Cobb et al. [1] demonstrated the utility of the three models by applying them to cases of agenda-setting in France, India, Liberia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania and United States. Unfortunately, only a handful of scholars have continued to apply the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models by Cobb et al. [1]. Some of these scholars include Cohen [12], who found that the successful attempts by U.S. presidents to list economic, foreign policy and civil rights issues on the public agenda followed the Mobilization model. Friedberg and Kfir [13] revealed that the Outside Initiative model was useful in explaining the processes that led to both the rise and fall of the complicated issue of emigration on the political agenda in Israel. Klumpes [14] also found that the agenda-setting and regulatory reform for pension fund accounting in Australia spanning a 20-year period followed the Outside Initiative model. More recently, Heo and Seo [15] made an important contribution by revealing that the introduction of foresight policy integration in South Korea was championed by three different groups of policy entrepreneurs, each following one of the three models.

The discussion above suggests that models by Cobb et al. [1] have the potential to generate interesting contributions to policy scholarship regarding the mobilization strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ to effect policy change. However, because these models have not been utilized as much as their prominent counterparts like the MSF and ACF, we have not realized their full potential. Hence, the goal of the present study was to contribute to the empirical literature on policy entrepreneurship by applying the Mobilization model of Cobb et al. [1] to understand the processes by which energy subsidy and resource revenue management reforms were successfully achieved in Ghana. Drawing on peer-reviewed articles, government reports, and publications by interest groups and international organizations, we conducted case studies to understand how Presidents Kufuor and Mills, two policy entrepreneurs with the requisite strategies, resources, and skills that successful entrepreneurs possess, executed strategic actions to successfully galvanized public support to effect policy changes during the 2005 fuel subsidy reform and the 2009-2011 petroleum revenue management reform, respectively, in Ghana.

Agenda-setting for fuel subsidy reform in Ghana

The government of Ghana subsidized fuel products such as gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and liquefied petroleum gas, and controlled fuel prices for many years. The decision to abolish fuel subsidies in Ghana is economically sound but presents political threats and risks to the party in power. As a result, different administrations have considered fuel market deregulation but have not been able to abolish fuel subsidies. In 2001, the first effort to allow the market to determine fuel prices in Ghana was made with the automatic pricing formula that allowed local prices to reflect changes in international price, but only to be abandoned a year later and reintroduced in 2003 Cooke [16]. In January 2003 when the formula was reintroduced, the price of fuel increased by about 90 percent while real income declined by 8.5 percent on average Coady and Newhouse [17], Cooke [16], Crawford [18]. Due to public pressure, the formula was abandoned again in 2004 Cooke [16]. According to Coady and Newhouse [17], the re-introduction of fuel subsidies led to an increase in subsidy expenditure from 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002 to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2004. In the face of high public debt, the government decided to abolish subsidies and mitigate the adverse effect on the poor by increasing cash transfers and other social welfare programs Cooke [16].

In 2005, the subsidies were abolished for the third time and the National Petroleum Authority (NPA) was established to deregulate the downstream petroleum sector Cooke [16], Laan [19]. However, fuel subsidies were briefly reinstated in 2008 but later abolished in 2009 after the 2008 national elections Cooke [16]. Fuel prices were adjusted upwards in 2009, 2011, and 2012, but after the 2012 national elections, subsidies were abolished completely in 2013 Cooke [16]. According to data from the National Petroleum Authority (NPA), subsidies were reintroduced for some products but have been abolished completely for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and liquefied petroleum gas since July 2015. The successful setting of the 2005 fuel subsidy reform agenda in Ghana followed the Mobilization model by Cobb et al. [1]. In a strategic move to eliminate fuel subsidies in 2005, the government of Ghana took several steps to reduce political opposition and build public support Laan [19].

i. Initiation: The need to abolish fuel subsidies in Ghana was articulated by President Kufuor in 2005. Discussions started between the president, government agencies and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to Bacon and Kojima (2006), the government carried out a Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) to assess the economic impact of eliminating fuel subsidies on the poor. Laan [19] noted that the PSIA was a strategic action and a necessary move by the government to communicate the need for subsidy reform and plans to mitigate the effect of higher prices on the poor. At this stage, the issue of subsidy reform has been listed on the formal agenda.

¹OIM, MM & IIM: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("outside initiative" OR "mobilization" OR "inside initiative" OR "inside access") AND ALL ("Cobb" AND "Ross")) AND ALL ("agenda building" OR "agenda setting")). MSF: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("multiple streams" OR "policy windows" OR "policy streams") AND ALL ("Kingdon")). ACF: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("advocacy coalition") AND ALL ("Sabatier")). EC: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("epistemic community") AND ALL ("Haas")). IC: (TITLE-ABS-KEY ("instrument constituency") AND ALL ("Voß" OR "Voss") AND ALL ("Simons")).

ii. **Specification:** The president made a public announcement of government's decision to abolish fuel subsidies and plans to increase social programs to support the poor Laan [19], Cooke et al. [1], Crawford [18]. The decision to abolish fuel subsidies was communicated to other public agencies, interest groups, and political parties by President Kufuor in his State of the Nation address to Parliament in February 2005 Laan [19], Cooke et al. [1]. The NPA was established by the NPA Act (June 2005) to manage and deregulate the market for refined petroleum products in Ghana. The management team of the NPA was composed of representatives from government, oil marketing companies, trade unions, expert groups and nonprofit organizations Coady and Newhouse [17], Crawford [18]. The Minister of Finance also made public announcements and explained how the savings of US\$25.5 million will be utilized to assist the poor Laan [19]. At this stage, the issue has been specified and the specific demands for the removal of fuel subsidies have been communicated.

iii. **Expansion:** In order to secure public support for successful implementation of the subsidy reform policy, a national campaign was organized. Newspaper publications were made comparing Ghana's fuel prices and subsidies to neighboring West African countries, meetings were held between the government and trade unions, the IMF's report on the PSIA was made available to the public, radio announcements were made Crawford [18], Laan [19] and the components of the new fuel pricing formula was published Laan [19]. The expansion of the issue of subsidy reform helped to win public support and minimize political opposition.

iv. **Entrance:** Having successfully communicated and convinced majority of the key actors in Parliament and the general public on the need and government's decision to abolish fuel subsidies in Ghana, the president, as the policy entrepreneur, won public support and the issue was listed on the public agenda. Fuel subsidies were abolished in 2005 and the NPA, an independent agency, was created to manage the fuel market Cooke et al. [1].

Agenda-setting for petroleum revenue management reform in Ghana

Ghana's first attempt at oil discovery was unsuccessful during onshore oil explorations in the Tano and Keta basins from 1896 to 1969 Donyinah [20]. In 1970, a modest discovery was made offshore in the Saltpond basin Donyinah [20], Gyampo [21]. However, in 2007, commercial discovery was made sixty kilometers offshore in the Jubilee fields Andrews [22]. The public was excited about the 2007 oil discovery as the country prepared for the first production of commercial oil in the Jubilee fields in late 2010 Andrews [22], Ayensu [23], Donyinah [20], Gyampo [21]. Adam [24] noted that revenues from the sale of oil totaled \$1.8 billion by the end of 2013. According to Kumar [25], Ghana's yearly oil revenue projection of USD 1 billion is equivalent to the amount the country receives in development assistance annually.

The government of Ghana decided to manage oil revenues differently from other mining revenues to avoid repeating the country's history of less transparency and accountability in the utilization of mining revenues. Ghana ranked second in gold production in Africa but has managed mining revenues poorly over the years Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney [26]. There were concerns in government over the management of oil revenues, especially since the management of mining revenues was entirely left to the discretion of the president. The government especially felt the need to manage oil revenues differently, partly due to the fact that the Jubilee discovery received much publicity as the international community took keen interest in how Ghana, considered to be a pacesetter in African democracy, would lead the way in managing oil revenues judiciously. Additionally, Ghana's government was determined to manage oil revenues and the whole upstream petroleum sector prudently to avoid the "resource curse" (the negative economic, social and political consequences that result from the mismanagement of windfall revenues) already experienced in some resource-rich African countries, such as Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Nigeria Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney [26], Broni-Bediako and Addei [27].

Before the commencement of oil production in the Jubilee fields 2010, the government took measures to develop and implement a petroleum revenue management policy to regulate the collection, reporting and utilization of oil revenues in Ghana. The objective of the government was to pursue policies that will foster fiscal stability and the creation of wealth for the future. In 2011, Ghana's Parliament passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815) to provide the legal framework for oil revenue management. Since the passage of the PRMA, Ghana has been receiving a lot of commendations from oil-rich countries and the international community for the monumental reform that promotes transparency and accountability in resource revenue management in developing countries see Van Gyampo [28], Suleman [29]. The strategic agenda-setting for the petroleum revenue management reform policy from 2009 to 2011 in Ghana followed the Mobilization model of Cobb et al. [1].

i. **Initiation:** Prior to President Mills taking office in 2009, President Kufuor had earlier articulated the need for an oil revenue management policy and established a Presidential Task Force to begin work on such a policy. In 2010, President Mills also expressed the need to have a revenue management policy, and shortly after reconstituted the task force to develop a petroleum revenue management bill. The task force consisted of representatives from government agencies such as the Ministries of Finance, Energy, Environment, and the Bank of Ghana. The Ministry of Finance conducted studies of oil revenue management in Alaska, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria and Norway to inform the development of Ghana's petroleum revenue management bill Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney [26].

ii. **Specification:** The task force further expressed the need for a petroleum revenue management law and communicated their work to other public agencies. They took several steps to inform key policy actors such as think tanks, academics, interest groups and traditional rulers in Ghana about the oil revenue management bill. The task force engaged with these actors in several workshops nation-wide to educate them about the benefits of such a law and solicit their inputs on the design and content of the bill.

iii. **Expansion:** The task force was then charged by the president to educate the general public about the oil revenue management bill and organize a national campaign to win public support for the passing of the bill into law by Parliament. Stakeholder workshops were held in all regions in the country along with national road shows to inform the public about the bill. A national survey was conducted to study the opinions of Ghanaians regarding how oil revenues should be utilized. According to the results of the survey, majority of the respondents requested that the government utilize seventy percent of the oil revenue as part of the national budget in priority areas to accelerate economic development and address the infrastructural challenges in the country. The survey also indicated that Ghanaians wanted the government to establish a fund to stabilize public spending when projected oil revenues budgeted for public expenditure is not realized due to oil proceeds falling short of projected oil revenues. Majority of the respondents also agreed to set aside a portion of the oil revenue to create wealth for future generations.

iv. **Entrance:** After the successful national campaign to inform the public and win public support for the proposed oil revenue management bill, the policy issue of developing a petroleum revenue management law has successfully moved from the formal agenda of the government and has been listed on the public agenda, a necessary advancement to guarantee the support of Ghanaians for smooth implementation of the law. The task force included the views of the public in their final draft of the bill that was presented to President Mills and cabinet. After the approval of the bill by the Cabinet, a Petroleum Revenue Management Bill was laid before Parliament. In 2011, Parliament passed the Bill into law as Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815). Since 2011, the public, opposition parties, interest groups, and think tanks have supported the implementation of the PRMA see Van Gyampo [28], Suleman [29]. The PRMA made provisions for the establishment of the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) and the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF), and prescribed the allocation, utilization, and reporting of petroleum revenues in Ghana Ayensu [23], Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney [26]. The GHF was created to build wealth for future generations when oil resources are depleted. Each year, seventy percent of project oil revenue is budgeted for public expenditure. The GSF was established to provide fiscal support to government expenditures when the projected revenue earmarked for public spending is not met due to a fall in oil prices or shortfall in oil production Ayensu [23], Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney [26].

Discussion and Conclusion

We found that the Mobilization model of Cobb et al. [1] adequately conceptualizes and explains the political processes and entrepreneurial strategies by which energy subsidy and resource revenue management reforms were successfully achieved in Ghana. In 2005, President Kufuor Initiated the issue of abolishing fuel subsidies by articulating the urgent need to end these subsidies to reduce the high public debt and Specified the issue by publicly announcing the decision to abolish fuel subsidies, new social protection programs to support those who would be affected by the decision, and the creation of the National Petroleum Authority to deregulate the fuel market. President Kufuor also Expanded the issue by organizing a national campaign to recruit public support and achieved Entrance by successfully listing the issue of fuel subsidy reform on the public agenda, which helped the government to abolish the subsidies without much political opposition. In 2009, President Mills Initiated the issue of managing oil revenues from the Jubilee fields differently by articulating the benefits of responsible windfall revenue management and Specified the issue by establishing a task force to design the Petroleum Revenue Management Bill. Additionally, President Mills Expanded the issue by directing the task force to organize a nation-wide campaign and a national survey to build public support for the Bill and solicit public opinion, respectively, and attained Entrance by successfully listing the issue on the public agenda, which allowed the smooth passage of the Petroleum Revenue Management Bill into law in 2011 by the Ghanaian Parliament.

This study demonstrates the utility of the Mobilization model and contributes to the empirical literature on policy entrepreneurship and political mobilization strategies. Several prominent theories and frameworks such as the MSF Kingdon [5] and the ACF Sabatier [6] have advanced our understanding of the behaviors of policy entrepreneurs. However, they have not adequately conceptualized the entrepreneurial strategies of political mobilization. The Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models by Cobb et al. [1] have already laid the foundation to that effect, but we have not given these models adequate attention. Given that no single policy theory can provide “a comprehensive description and explanation” of the policy process Sabatier and Weible [30], the application of diverse theories can help unpack the “complexity of the practice of policymaking” John [31]. The MSF was developed as a framework for studying only agenda-setting. The ACF was also developed as a framework for understanding policy change in complex political systems. Today, these frameworks have been transformed into robust theories over decades of continuous application and refinement. To help transform the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models into robust frameworks and theories, scholars are encouraged to apply the models to study entrepreneurship in policy formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation; develop testable hypotheses to improve their explanatory power;

and delineate the similarities and differences between the Outside Initiative, Mobilization, and Inside Initiative models and the MSF, ACF, EC, and IC frameworks. With this study, we hope to encourage the application and refinement of these models [32,33].

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